Monetary historians conventionally trace the establishment of the Federal Reserve System in 1913 to the turbulence of the Panic of 1907. But why did the successful movement for creating a U.S. central bank follow the Panic of 1907 and not any earlier National Banking Era panic? The 1907 panic displayed a less severe output contraction than other national banking era panics, and national bank deposit and loan data suggest only a limited impairment to intermediation through these institutions.
The first reason is that the Panic of 1907 struck primarily the New York City trust companies. Moen and Tallman (1992) show how New York City trust companies were much more affected by panic withdrawals in 1907 than were New York City national banks. During the Panic of 1907, loans at New York City trust companies fell precipitously by nearly 37 percent. In contrast, loans at New York City national banks increased by over 8 percent. It is notable that New York City trust companies were not members of the New York Clearinghouse. Timberlake (1984) and Gorton (1985) describe how the private clearinghouses employed specific mechanisms to stem panics during National Banking Era panics. In panics prior to 1907, the New York Clearinghouse addressed runs on member institutions by providing adequate reserves to solvent member banks. The clearinghouse had timely information on member balance sheets, and so could make quick evaluations of the solvency of member banks. During the 1907 panic, the Clearinghouse lacked sufficient timely information about the trust companies' balance sheets to make reliable inferences about the solvency of these institutions. Lacking this information on trust companies, the New York Clearinghouse was averse to lending to them. The historical record shows that the Clearinghouse delayed action toward trusts and failed to act as lender of last resort to that class of intermediary with any degree of certainty. Eventually, J.P. Morgan, whose efforts in quelling the 1907 panic are legendary, convinced a coalition of bankers to aid the trusts, presumably because letting the trusts go it alone posed a risk to the entire financial system. Plan included compulsory membership in the system of centralized reserves to overcome the risks observed from having trusts, controlling a large proportion of intermediary assets in New York City, isolated from the New York Clearinghouse, the reserve providers, during the Panic of 1907. 3 The thesis of this paper follows: the panics of the National Banking Era before 1907 focused on clearinghouse member banks (national and some state banks). By starting amidst the trust companies, the Panic of 1907 was unique, leaving the clearinghouse with much less information about probable solvency of the institutions that were suffering runs on deposits. In the aftermath of the panic, the younger bankers in New York were freed from the constraining attitudes and influence of the older banking generation hostile towards the concept of establishing a central bank in the US. The movement for some type of central bank capable of preventing isolation of solvent institutions from available reserves was then able to proceed.
II. Background and Previous Research
There are many extensive studies on the evolution of the US financial system toward establishing a central bank (Livingston 1986 , McCulley 1991 , Broz 1997 Livingston (1986) suggests that the successful establishment of a central bank in the United States had its origins in the aftermath of the 1890s banking panics. Much attention in the debate over monetary reform focussed on the provision of an "elastic currency," one that could adjust more rapidly to the fluctuations in depositor demands than could national bank notes, diverting attention from establishing a central bank. The 1 Note that White analyzes an aggregation of state banks and trusts as intermediaries outside the National Banking system and the clearinghouses. Our analysis focuses on trusts separately, noting that in prior research, Moen and Tallman (1992,1999) show that trusts suffered more extreme deposit losses than state banks in New York during the 1907 Panic. We infer that state banks did not involve the same "risks" as trusts.
2 White (1983) , p 80.
3 White (1983) pp. 81-82. movements clamoring for monetary reform typically originated in the mid-west. A main element of one reform faction was the idea of an "asset-backed currency" --their goal was to eliminate the bond collateral requirement for National Bank notes as specified in the National Banking Act of 1863. 5 The concept of an asset-backed currency is somewhat related to the older idea known as the "real bills" doctrine. 6 The asset-backed currency became a key feature of the Baltimore Plan of 1894, an early vehicle to focus debate on monetary reform. No successful reform activity resulted from this initiative (see Selgin and White 1994) . According to Sprague (1910) and Livingston (1986) , the reform of the monetary system took a back seat to the issue of monetizing silver and bimetallism that dominated the political landscape from 1895 to 1900.
A later effort at monetary reform was the Indianapolis Monetary Commission Moen and Tallman (1999).
5 Champ, Smith and Williamson (1996) examine the contrast between the Canadian banking system and the US system around 1900. They conclude that the issuance of emergency currency in Canada backed by "general assets" of a bank allowed the elasticity necessary in that banking system. Separately, the American Bankers Association formed a commission to study a plan to establish an "elastic currency," and the communication between the ABA and the New York group was generally receptive. Over time, however, the New York financial 6 Real bills doctrine proponents argue that self-liquidating, short-term loans or commercial paper were the proper backing for a currency, as opposed to government bonds or other longer-term assets.
interests became skeptical of an "asset-backed" currency. Jacob Schiff stated "Personally, I hold strongly to the opinion that it will prove unwise, if not dangerous, to cloth six thousand banks or more with the privilege to issue independently a purely credit currency, no matter how complete the safeguards may appear" (Livingston 1986, p. 169) .
Paul Warburg also criticized the idea of an assets currency. Summarizing his views in his recollections on the creation of the Federal Reserve System, Paul Warburg noted There were other groups in Congress, which advocated so-called "assetcurrency" plans. Representatives of this school of thought were moving on sound lines, when proposing to make commercial assets the basis of circulation. They were preaching unsound doctrines, however, when they urged that individual commercial banks should be authorized to issue notes against their own assets, and that they should be permitted to do so without providing a safe machinery for securing such notes and redeeming them in gold (Warburg 1930, p. 19 ).
The general opinion turned against asset-backed currency so much that Bankers Magazine observed that reformers were abandoning that idea for monetary reform (see also McCulley 1992, p. 130).
Sprague observed that the events during the panic of 1893 did little to increase sentiment for a central bank, particularly among New York bankers. Indeed, he argues that it probably damped it:
The experience derived from this crisis (of 1893) led to no changes whatever either in banking methods or in legislation. The silver question drew away men's minds from any consideration of the questions raised by earlier crises. Whether the banks through their own efforts might not place themselves in a better position to meet future emergencies does not seem to have been discussed. Both bankers and the public seem to have been well satisfied with the showing made by the banks, especially those of New York; and indeed if comparison be made with the policy adopted by the Chicago banks (of not issuing clearinghouse certificates quickly), the banks of the metropolis met the situation in a creditable fashion (Sprague 1910, p. 210) .
Until 1907, New York national banks handled financial crises adequately on their own, at least in terms of protecting the clearinghouse member banks. It is possible that they may have even profited from crises (Donaldson 1992 (Donaldson , 1993 . Under such circumstances, one would expect little enthusiasm for the institution of a central bank in the US coming from New York banking forces.
III. Theoretical Models of Banking Panics -Motivations for a Central Bank
The seminal literature describing theoretical models of bank runs beginning with Bryant (1980) and Diamond and Dybvig (1983) Timberlake ( 1984) and Gorton (1985) discuss the role of private clearinghouse behavior during the National Banking Era . These papers emphasize the quasi-regulatory role of clearinghouses and the specific mechanisms used to combat widespread runs on deposits during banking panics. These papers provide a sense in which the existing clearinghouse system may have been sufficient to quell panics, and that the establishment of the Federal Reserve System may have been unnecessary. Donaldson (1992 Donaldson ( , 1993 reserves. In the model, the existence of banking panics is a mechanism to punish nonmember financial institutions for holding lower than optimal reserves while benefiting clearinghouse members that hold a higher level of reserves. Nonmember institutions free ride on the reserve holdings of the clearinghouse in this model, but the clearinghouse lacks the power to enforce any direct penalty on nonmember institutions for holding lower reserves. In the model, if the lower reserve holding of nonmember institutions persists without fear of penalty, the nonmember institutions would dominate the clearinghouse member institutions because of the lower reserve tax. During panics, the clearinghouse alleviates the ill effects of banking panics for clearinghouse members, but nonmember institutions are penalized for holding too few reserves by being forced to liquidate some assets prematurely, contract in size, or even shut down.
Our evidence provides a resolution to the implications widespread in the literature. In contrast to Timberlake and Gorton, this paper argues that the participants in the quelling of the Banking Panic of 1907 were unsatisfied that the clearinghouse system, with its circumscribed membership, could deal effectively with the increasing risks arising outside the clearinghouse system. Donaldson's model appears appropriate for the national banking era panics before 1907, in which the banks struck by runs on deposits were typically members of the clearinghouse. In 1907, the banking panic affected mainly the New York City trusts and posed a risk to the payments system that the clearinghouse was unable to monitor effectively.
We view our evidence as supportive of the implications in McAndrew and
Roberds ( 
IV. Trust Companies and the New York Money Market
The assets of trust companies grew tremendously after 1896; by 1907 total assets of trust companies and of national banks in New York City were about the same. Table 1 presents the volume of assets held by national banks and by trust companies in New York
City in 1896 and 1907; while both types of intermediaries grew rapidly, trust companies grew more rapidly than the clearinghouse member national banks --204% compared to 135% (Moen and Tallman 1992, p.612) . In terms of annual average growth rates, national bank assets grew at about 7.5 percent a year, whereas trusts assets grew at a rate closer to 10 percent a year. Initially trust companies were rather conservative institutions, designed to manage trust funds and estates, and to serve as a place to park short term accounts. Because of their lower risk activities, trusts were less regulated, had lower capital requirements, and also had lower cash reserve requirements than national or state banks in New York (Moen and Tallman 1992, 1999) . Trusts evolved into more speculative institutions, however, as their owners became aware of the broad range of investments open to trusts; for example, trusts were able to invest in real estate and stock market assets, whereas national banks were prohibited from such investments. Trusts generally offered higher returns to their depositors because they held fewer reserves (and hence paid a lower reserve tax) than national banks and because of their freedom to invest in a broader array of assets than the national banks.
Trust company deposits were generally less crucial in payments transactions, for example, trust check volume was only 7 percent of the check volume of national banks in New York City. 7 Still, trust deposits were demandable debt contracts, demand deposits with comparable characteristics to demand deposits at national banks. Hence, when struck with a panic, trusts were faced with the same dilemma implicit in any fractional reserve banking system -not all demands for liquidation of deposits could be satisfied. after the clearinghouse passed a resolution that required nonmember institutions to hold no less than 10 percent cash reserves by 1904 (Cannon 1910, p. 178) In 1906, in response to the complaints of the national banking interests, New
York State imposed a 15 percent reserve requirement on trusts, but only one third of reserves had to be in the form of currency in the vault. The rest could be on deposit as banker's balances or as specified bonds (Barnett 1910, p. 129) . In contrast, the national banks were required by the National Bank Acts to keep a 25 percent reserve in the form of non-interest bearing specie or legal tender, a much more severe constraint than that when the panic strikes. In contrast, we observe that in 1907 national bank loans and deposits increase while reserves decline. We interpret the decline in the reserves as an indication that there was some form of disintermediation taking place. The increase in loans and deposits, however, is also an indication that the national banks were not the focus of the Panic of 1907.
We suggest that the panic-related withdrawals from trusts forced the trusts to find additional sources of reserves because the trusts held a low proportion of reserves to 
V. New York Bankers and the Panic of 1907

A. Changing Attitudes in the Old Guard.
A change in attitudes within in the New York banking community helps explain why the events of 1907 were so influential in spurring the creation of the Fed. In the wake of the panic, the New York banking forces perceived the trusts as much riskier institutions, "the major sources of instability at the nation's financial center" (McCulley 1991, p. 201) . And the risk posed by the trust companies to the payments system had not gone unnoticed by several rising bankers even before the panic. In this group of bankers This memorandum was shown to Mr. Jacob Schiff, then the senior partner of the banking firm Kuhn, Loeb & Company, of which I had lately become a member. Mr. Schiff read the paper with interest and told me, what afterwards he often repeated, that, while theoretically he agreed with most of the thoughts expressed, he believed that I was misjudging the psychology of the American people, who would never, he said, accept any system approaching a central bank. But since he always appreciated earnest efforts on the part of his juniors and never missed an opportunity for encouraging them, he suggested that I let him show the paper confidentially to two friends. One of these was James A. Stillman, president of the National City Bank of New York. It was significant, however, of the atmosphere in which we were living that Mr. Schiff warned me to be careful not to have the memorandum go any further, lest, having just arrived from Europe, I might impair my standing in the banking community by creating the impression that I was urging a system which, in the final analysis, would have to be built around a central bank organization. I gladly accepted Mr. Schiff's suggestion, and a few days afterwards I found Mr. Stillman standing over my desk. He looked at me silently, as was his wont, through his half-closed, heavy dark eyes. "How is the great international financier?" he asked with friendly sarcasm. He then added, "Warburg, don't you think the City Bank has done pretty well?" I replied, "Yes Mr. Stillman, extraordinarily well." He then said, "Why not leave things alone?" It was not without hesitation that I replied, "Your bank is so big and so powerful, Mr. Stillman, that when the next panic comes, you will wish your responsibilities were smaller."
At this, Mr. Stillman told me that I was entirely wrong, that I had the mistaken notion that Europe's banking methods were the most advanced, while, as a matter of fact, American methods represented an improvement upon, and an evolution of, the European system, America having already discarded its central bank. He had no doubt that progress would have to be sought, not by copying European methods, but by elaborating our own.
Four years later, in the midst of the panic (of 1907), I found Mr. Stillman once more standing over my desk; and when I looked up, he asked, "Warburg, where is your paper?" I said to him, "Too late now, Mr. Stillman. What has to be done cannot be done in a hurry. If reform is to be secured, it will take years of educational work to bring it about."
This incident is related for the sole purpose of showing the status of banking and business opinion in those far-off days. What Mr. Stillman had said was typical of the general attitude then prevailing (Warburg 1930, pp. 18-19) ."
Clearly, the Panic of 1907 altered at least one influential banker's opinion on the future organization of US banking. The influence of Stillman should not be underestimated, as one biographer recalls how Stillman had to convince a stubborn JP Morgan to aid the Trust Company of America after the Knickerbocker trust had suspended (Burr 1927, pp. 233-34) . Morgan apparently believed that he shouldn't have to risk his own assets to save an imprudent intermediary. Henry Davison and Paul Warburg were others who had my deep respect after the panic. These two and Ben Strong and I were among the few men who, at that time, were fully persuaded that the remedy for the weakness in our banking system was the creation of some sort of a central institution to hold the reserves of the country. Only when such a common reservoir existed, we were convinced, would it be possible to use the reserves effectively.
We were entirely right because, if the Federal Reserve System had been in existence in 1907, the thing that brought about the financial paralysis, the mad scramble for individual reserves, would not have occurred; there would have been no panic in 1907. However, even when the madness was over, and when their lesson should have been well-learned, many of the oldest, the most distinguished, and respected bankers of the country were still opposed to banking law reform. They understood the old, haphazard system. Consequently, they were disposed to reprove younger men, who wanted to change, by reminding them that the existing national banking system had served the nation through the years of expansion after the 'sixties; it should not, they insisted, become the plaything of tinkerers or theorists. Their minds were as little engaged by the obvious as are those of their successors by the weaknesses of the gold standard (Vanderlip 1935, pp. 180-81) .
B. Awareness of the Risk Posed by Trust Companies
Many of the bankers who were involved in the movement for a central bank made specific references to the trusts and the problem of allocating reserves to solvent institutions in the absence of a centralized reserve mechanism. Centralized monitoring was not explicitly mentioned, but descriptions of the financing of the Panic, especially those that focus on the effort of Benjamin Strong to assess the financial condition of the Knickerbocker Trust, implicitly describe the lack of monitoring information on trusts at the Clearinghouse. Thus, the two related issues -how to monitor and how to allocate emergency reserves -centered on the relationship between the clearinghouse and the intermediaries outside the regulatory structure of the National Banking System. James Stillman, in February of 190 7, displayed prescience with regard to the oncoming panic. In a letter responding to Frank Vanderlip's complaint that National City was holding too high a reserve ratio, Stillman wrote:
I have felt for sometime that the next panic and low interest rates following would straighten out a good many things that have of latter years crept into banking. What impresses me as most important is to go into next Autumn (usually a time of financial stringency) ridiculously strong and liquid, and now is the time to begin and shape for it. … (I)f by able and judicious management we have money to help our dealers when trust companies have suspended, we will have all the business we want for many years. (Stillman to Vanderlip, February 12, 1907. In Cleveland and Huertas, 1983) The quote reinforces the idea that the Stillman expected the trust companies to suffer in the next banking panic. What appeared to be excessive cash reserves at National City Bank was simply preparation for the next financial crisis, one in which Stillman thought the national banks would prevail. Having "all the business we want for many years" is consistent with McAndrews and Roberd's characterization of panics as a means to discipline competitors free-riding on the national bank's higher reserve position. White (1983) notes that broad coverage of the centralized reserves system was an important objective of reformers (pp. 81-83) . Unfortunately, the final outcome of federal legislative negotiations, the Federal Reserve System, did not compel membership. White also discusses the failure of the Federal Reserve System to garner a large proportion of state banks and trusts as members (pp. 63-64).
Vanderlip was more than disappointed. The failure to force state banks and trusts into the system would leave unrepaired what was a key flaw in the National Banking System.
As noted above, McAndrew and Roberds (1995) propose that the existence of bank panics had provided national banks a mechanism to hinder the growth of fringe intermediaries that were less involved in the payments system. By the time the panic of 1907 took place, trusts in New York City were in the aggregate too large to have their growth checked through panics, at least without risking severe damage to the payments system.
From our viewpoint, the key element of monetary reform was to compel widespread membership in any clearinghouse arrangement. Simply providing broader access to reserves, without subjecting more intermediaries to the clearinghouse's (or some centralized controlling body) examination authority would leave the system at risk.
As stated above, our thesis is similar to Eugene White's critique of the Federal Reserve System that arises from the split between state and nationally chartered intermediaries, members and nonmembers. But we are more specific -if membership in a clearinghouse or central banking system was voluntary, then the financial system would still be subject to the problem that a group of institutions could remain outside the clearinghouse. This set of intermediaries, less regulated and with potentially profitable opportunities unavailable to those within the regulatory structure, could remain a source of systemic risk. Without clearinghouse monitoring to go along with reliable access to reserves, these intermediaries would still pose a risk for the entire payments system. The New York banking interests influenced the design of the central bank legislation that was initially introduced in Congress. Vanderlip (1935) (Friedman and Schwartz 1963, pp. 358-59) . The Fed's behavior during the Depression was strongly parallel to that of the New York national banks during the Panic of 1907.
VI. Conclusion
Economic historians typically view the recurrence of financial panics during the National Banking Era as placing the entire payments system at risk, a risk comparable to the current concept of "systemic risk." Certain contemporary accounts and recent research suggest that the panics were focused and at times reasonably well- 
